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Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation 
Abstract 
 
Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation: 
Asset Limit Changes, Financial Assets, and Vehicle Ownership 
 
Objective. Over the past decade, federal and state governments have substantially 
liberalized asset limits in welfare. This paper examines whether this policy change promotes 
asset accumulation among the target population of actual and potential welfare recipients.  
Methods. Utilizing household data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and state data, this 
study employs a difference-in-difference approach in order to determine whether state asset 
limits affect the target population’s financial and vehicle asset accumulation. This study 
develops a new policy measure that considers the time period following the adoption of 
liberalized asset limits. Results. Analysis results suggest that increased asset limits may have 
successfully encouraged the target population’s asset accumulation. The earlier a state raised its 
asset limit, the more likely welfare recipients were to accumulate financial assets and to possess 
bank accounts. Conclusion. It is recommended to liberalize asset eligibility rules to promote 
long-term economic advancement of poor households.  
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Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation: 
Asset Limit Changes, Financial Assets, and Vehicle Ownership 
 
Financial assets and physical properties play a critical role in determining a household’s 
long-term well-being, especially for low-income households. Assets can improve economic 
stability by mitigating the adverse effects of sudden income loss and unexpected expenditures. 
They can promote economic development by enabling investment in education and 
entrepreneurship. They may improve the social and psychological well-being of asset holders 
(Sherraden 1991; Edin 2001; Shapiro 2001). Despite the potential benefits, asset holding among 
American households, especially low-income households, is quite low. Thirteen percent of 
American households have zero or negative net worth and 16 percent have zero financial assets 
(Carney and Gale 2001). Saving rates among poor households are much lower than among high- 
or middle-income households even after controlling for income (Ziliak 2003). 
Low levels of asset accumulation among low-income households have been, at least 
partially, attributed to asset tests in public assistance programs. Asset tests require households to 
keep their financial and vehicle assets below limits set by federal or state governments in order 
to qualify for a variety of income maintenance programs. As such, asset tests can be detrimental 
to impoverished households by imposing a strong saving disincentive (Ziliak 2003; Neumark 
and Powers 1998; Powers 1998; Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1995).  
In recognition of this problem, federal and state governments have substantially 
liberalized asset limits in the last two decades (Savner and Greenberg 1995; Corporation for 
Enterprise Development 2002). This study investigates whether these liberalizations in asset 
tests have stimulated financial and vehicle asset accumulation among the target population of 
likely welfare recipients, using household data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) and state-level data. This paper contributes to the existing research by utilizing a new 
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measure of state asset limit policy: the length of time since a liberalized policy has been adopted. 
In doing so, it is recognized that states introduced new asset limits at different time-points and 
that it might take time for the target population to learn about and adapt to policy changes. The 
new measure of policy changes in this study also broadens the approach to understanding the 
ways in which new public policies affect the target population.   
BACKGROUND 
Most public assistance programs in the United States have asset limits in their eligibility 
rules. The program typically termed “welfare” [Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) prior to the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) after the PRWORA] is no 
exception. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981 set limits at $1,200 for 
vehicle asset and at $1,000 for countable assets (cash on hand, values in saving and checking 
accounts, bonds, stocks, and vehicle values that exceed vehicle asset limit) at the federal level 
and prohibited state governments from raising these limits (Powers 1998). The vehicle asset limit 
increased to $1,500 per household later and remained at that level until state governments began 
to raise their limits after the enactment of the Family Support Act of 1988 (Corporation for 
Enterprise Development 2002). 
Restrictive asset limits have been blamed for low levels of asset accumulation among 
poor households. In order to qualify for asset-tested public assistance programs, low-income 
households are required to spend down or to maintain their financial and vehicle assets below the 
limits. Current and potential recipients, therefore, face strong disincentives to saving. Existing 
empirical research suggests that this saving disincentive has operated for various asset-tested 
income transfer programs and contributes to low saving rates among low-income households 
(Gruber and Yelowitz 1999; Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1995; Powers 1998; Ziliak 2003). For 
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example, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey, Powers (1998) studied the effects of 
the federalization of the AFDC program’s asset-testing policy in 1981 that dramatically lowered 
asset limits in many states. She finds that higher asset limits are strongly associated with higher 
savings among current and potential welfare recipients: an increase of $1 in asset limits raised a 
female head’s savings by $0.25. 
Recognizing the disincentives of asset limits, both federal and state governments began 
to liberalize AFDC/TANF asset tests in the early 1990s. The Family Support Act of 1988 
allowed states to request a waiver from the federal government to raise asset limits. The 
PRWORA of 1996 abolished the federal asset limits for TANF, allowing states to create their 
own thresholds (Savner and Greenberg 1995; Corporation for Enterprise Development 2002). 
State governments accordingly increased their asset limits in AFDC/TANF during the 1990s1 
(Corporation for Enterprise Development 2002; Savner and Greenberg 1995; Urban Institute 
2005). As of the year 2000, 43 states had relaxed their rules on countable asset limits to some 
degree and all states had raised vehicle asset limits.  
[Table 1 About Here] 
A couple of existing studies have empirically tested whether increased asset limits 
facilitated asset accumulation among the target population of likely welfare participants 
(Sullivan 2006; Hurst and Ziliak 2006). Using PSID data, Hurst and Ziliak (2006) found that 
gaps in asset accumulation between likely and unlikely welfare program participants (female-
headed households with children vs. other types of households) do not significantly differ  
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1 Some states introduced special account programs for welfare recipients during the 1990s. These special accounts 
have separate and higher asset limits than general accounts but withdrawals are limited to certain types of activities 
(e.g., higher education). This study does not include this policy measure because it often overlaps with state 
Individual Development Accounts (IDA), an asset-building program (matched saving program) for low-income 
households. IDA programs probably affect the asset accumulation of the comparison group in this study (e.g. male-
headed households) as well as the target population (female-headed households with children).   
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between states with and without generous asset rules. These findings apply for various asset 
measures, including financial assets, possession of a bank account, and ownership of a house or 
business. An exception is vehicle ownership: more generous countable asset limits appear to 
significantly promote likely welfare recipients’ vehicle ownership. Sullivan (2006) used data 
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and found that liberalized vehicle 
asset limit is associated with an increase in vehicle ownership for single mothers without a high 
school degree while relaxation of countable asset limits does not have any statistically significant 
association with vehicle ownership. While both studies reach the conclusion that relaxed asset 
limits appear to promote vehicle ownership, each identifies a different cause. Hurst and Ziliak 
(2006) link increased vehicle ownership with changes in countable asset limits, while Sullivan 
(2006) contributes it to relaxed vehicle asset eligibility rules. Both studies conclude that relaxed 
countable asset limits have not promoted the target population’s financial asset accumulation.  
These two studies focus mainly on the degree of liberalization in asset tests, i.e.  the 
actual dollar amounts of asset limits. While these measures are valid and valuable, they may not 
fully capture the effects of policy changes. Since it may take time for the target population to 
learn about and adapt to policy changes, analyses should also take into account the elapsed time 
since a policy change has occurred. In addition, states that adopted new asset limits early often 
have lower asset limits than states introducing new asset rules later. For example, California 
increased its countable asset limit to $2, 000 in 1994, which is much lower than that of North 
Dakota ($8,000) or Nebraska ($6,000). These two states raised their countable asset limits in 
1998, four years later than California. Given the considerable variation in when state 
governments adopted new asset policies, the length of time since policy change occurred may be 
even more illuminating than the extent of policy changes at the time of a study. 
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This article builds on and expands prior studies of asset tests and asset accumulation 
among likely welfare recipients. In addition to measures of policy changes used in the two 
existing studies (Sullivan 2006; Hurst and Ziliak 2006), this study includes a new measure of 
policy changes: the elapsed time after policy adoption. With this new policy measure, this study 
estimates the effectiveness of relaxed asset limits more broadly than previous studies.  
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. Data, Sample, and Descriptive Statistics 
This study combines household data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
with state-level data capturing variation in state-level policies and economic conditions. The 
PSID initially interviewed a nationally representative sample of 4,802 families in 1968. Since 
then, the PSID has interviewed respondents about economic and demographic characteristics 
annually until 1997 and biennially thereafter. When weighted, the sample is designed to be 
representative of the non-immigrant U.S. population as a whole (Hill, 1992).  
The PSID collects data on households’ assets and liabilities in its wealth supplement. The 
PSID’s wealth data contain extensive information regarding assets and liabilities. The wealth 
data in the PSID is reported to be of high quality in comparison to other survey data (Curtin, 
Juster, and Morgan 1989). The PSID collected wealth data every five years between 1984 and 
1999 (in 1984, 1989, 1994, and 1999) and biennially after 1999. This study uses the PSID wealth 
data collected in 1994 and 2001 and other household data collected between those years.  
This study employs the same sample selection criteria used in Hurst and Ziliak (2006). 
The sample is limited to households headed by the same heads who maintained the same marital 
status throughout the observation period (1994-2001). Marriage, divorce, and death of spouse 
may cause dramatic changes in financial assets and physical properties. The sample is restricted 
to households whose heads were 18-44 years old in 1994 and had less than 16 years of education 
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because they are more likely to receive welfare than other groups. Among female-headed 
households, the sample includes only those who consistently have at least one child during the 
observation period (female-headed households with children sample) or have no children in any 
year for the same period (female-headed households without children sample).  Households that 
moved from one state to another are excluded from the sample. Ohio residents are removed from 
the sample because Ohio was the only state without the countable asset limit as of 2000.2  
The final sample consists of 1,363 households. The sample is divided into two groups: 
the target population of likely welfare recipients (277 female-headed households with children) 
and a non-target group (1,086 male-headed households and female-headed households without 
children). This study does not define the target population based on an individual household’s 
welfare experience because welfare rule changes may affect not only current and past welfare 
recipients but also households who may potentially receive welfare in the future. Two previous 
studies, Hurst and Ziliak (2006) and Sullivan (2006) use the same criteria in defining the target 
population. The target group received welfare at much higher rates than the comparison group. 
Forty-eight percent of the households in the target group received welfare at least once during 
the observation period whereas 2 percent of the households in the comparison group did (Please 
refer to Table 2 for details).  
In addition, this study creates an additional comparison group, consisting of male-headed 
households with children (N=565). This comparison group is used in some of analyses to check 
robustness of findings. As in the main comparison group, this group’s welfare program 
participation was very low (about 2 %). This study also creates another sample for robustness 
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2 The only difference from Hurst and Ziliak’s (2006) sample is that this study does not exclude those with missing 
wealth data. The PSID imputed missing data on wealth and did not provide any indicator of imputation at the time 
when the author retrieved data. 
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check: a sample composed of households headed by those with less than 13 years of schooling. 
This sample consists of 914 households (188 female-headed households and 726 male-headed 
household and female-headed households without children). The difference in welfare 
participation rates is larger between target and non-target groups in this sample: 56 percent of the 
target group ever received welfare between 1994 and 2001 while only two percent of the 
comparison group did.     
B. Measures 
The major independent variables in this study are state-level asset limits in welfare 
program. The state welfare policy data were created using various sources, including Savner and 
Greenberg (1995) and the Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database (Urban Institute 2005). In 
creating the state asset limit policy dataset, this study counts policies that applied to the majority 
of current welfare recipients for the majority of a year as instances of policy change. 
Accordingly, a policy change is counted only if it was applied statewide, not limited to certain 
experimental sites in a state. For those states that set different asset limits by family size, this 
study uses the asset limit that is likely to have applied to the majority of welfare families (e.g. an 
asset limit for a family with two or more members instead of that for a single individual). This 
study uses asset limits on current welfare recipients, not those on welfare applicants. Due to 
these additional restrictions, the state policy measures used in this study are slightly different 
from those reported in Hurst and Ziliak (2006).3  
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3 Hurst and Ziliak (2006) use asset limits different from those used in this study for some states. They use an 
average of two countable asset limits ($5000, an average of $4,000 for single individuals and $6,000 for households 
with two or more members) for Nebraska and use asset limits for welfare applicants for New Hampshire and 
Oregon. Their countable asset limit for Washington ($4,000) is different from $3,000 in the Urban Institute (2005) 
and State Policy Demonstration Project (http://www.spdp.org/medicaid/table_6.htm). Hurst and Ziliak (2006) utilize 
the values of the vehicle limits when states adopted new limits for the first time for three states (North Carolina, 
South Carolina, and South Dakota), instead of vehicle asset limits as of 2000. Vehicle limits of District of 
Columbia, Mississippi, and West Virginia used in Hurst and Ziliak (2006) are different from those in this study. 
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As briefly mentioned above, this study develops two separate sets of asset policy 
measures. The first type of measure, which is the dollar amount of the asset limit (as it applies to 
countable assets and vehicles) is identical to that used in Sullivan (2006) and Hurst and Ziliak 
(2006). For countable asset limit, the variable measuring the actual amount of limits is used in 
analyses. Since several states eliminated the vehicle asset limit during the 1990s, this study 
creates two vehicle asset limit policy variables: one indicates whether a state has a vehicle asset 
limit or not (1 if a state has a vehicle asset limit and 0 otherwise) and the other is a continuous 
measure of the actual amount of vehicle asset limit for states with vehicle asset limits (0 for 
states without limits). The second set of asset limit policy variables is unique to this study: the 
number of years since a new asset limit was introduced for each type of asset. This variable 
ranges from zero (for states that made no changes to asset limits) to seven years for countable 
asset limits and from two to seven years for vehicle asset limits.  
The main dependent variables are financial assets, bank account ownership, and vehicle 
assets. This study focuses on financial and vehicle assets because they are counted toward asset 
limits in determining welfare eligibility. Welfare systems do not count non-financial assets (e.g., 
home values) or debt into countable assets when determining welfare eligibility (Corporation for 
Enterprise Development 2002). Accordingly, the household’s financial and vehicle asset 
holdings are the appropriate measure in estimating the impact of asset policy changes. This study 
pays attention to bank account ownership since opening a bank account is often the first step in 
accumulating financial assets and other types of wealth (Beverly et al. 2003).  
In creating financial asset accumulation variables, this study measures change in financial 
assets between the observation periods (1994 and 2001), as did Hurst and Ziliak (2006). The 
value of the financial asset variable is created by combining the amount of money in 
checking/saving accounts and other financial institutes and the cash values of stocks and mutual 
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funds or investment trust. The values of financial assets in 1994 and 2001 are converted into 
constant 1996 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The level of change in financial 
assets is created by subtracting the amount of financial assets held in 2001 from that in 1994.  
In analyzing financial asset accumulation, this study uses three types of dependent 
variables: 1) a dichotomous variable, indicating whether a household achieved any positive 
saving in financial assets between the two time periods (1 if any positive changes in the level  of 
financial assets, and 0 otherwise), 2) the actual dollar amount of change that an individual 
household experienced between 1994 and 2001 (in 1996 dollars), and 3) the natural logarithm of 
the dollar amount of financial asset change. The third measure, the logarithm of financial asset 
change, is unique in this study. This variable is used in Heckman model that investigate the 
association between asset policy and the amount of savings while considering the possibility that 
those who succeeded in saving may differ from those who did not (e.g., the former may have 
learned about asset limit policy changes earlier than the latter). This study uses a natural 
logarithm instead of the actual amount because several extremely high values make the 
distribution skewed. The third measure has valid values solely for those who have positive 
values for the second measure because negative and zero values in the second measure become 
missing through the conversion process.  
The bank account ownership variable is a dichotomous variable that assigns a value of 
one to households that report having any positive value in checking or saving accounts and a 
value of zero otherwise. The vehicle ownership variable is created in the same way (1 if a 
household reports to own at least a vehicle and 0 otherwise).  
C. Analytic Methods: Difference-In-Difference Approach 
This study employs a difference-in-difference approach. This approach assesses the 
effectiveness of a policy through assessing whether the impact of a policy change on the target 
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group (likely welfare recipients) is different from the impact on the non-target population (those 
with low probability of receiving welfare). The approach thus controls for unobserved 
confounding factors, such as state residents’ propensity toward saving. The analytical model is 
as follows: 
ii ixiiPTiTiP XTPTPS εββββα ++×+++= ×  
where Si represents an asset measure for an individual household i  
Pi indicates a vector of asset limit policies in the state of an individual household i 
Ti is a dummy for the target group  
Xi is a vector of control variables, including household and state characteristics  
εi is the residual for individual household i  
The coefficient on the interaction term between state asset limit and high-risk of 
receiving welfare, PT×β , is the primary interest of this study. It identifies whether and to what 
extent the target and comparison groups react in different ways to changes in asset limit policies. 
It is expected that the effect of asset limit policies, should they have any effect, will be 
concentrated among those with a higher-risk of receiving welfare. If asset limit policies 
encourage asset accumulation, especially among the target population, then PT×β  should be 
positive and significant, indicating that the state policy environment stimulates asset 
accumulation among the target group in a significantly different way from how it affects the 
comparison group. 
The statistical method of estimation varies with the type of dependent variable. For the 
dichotomous dependent variable (e.g. positive change in the level of financial assets, or bank 
account or vehicle ownership), this study uses a linear probability model. Results using a logistic 
regression or a linear probability model with robust standard errors do not differ substantively 
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from those reported in this paper. In the analyses with the continuous variable measuring the 
amount of changes in financial assets between the two observation periods, this study employs 
regressions with bootstrapped standard errors, following Hurst and Ziliak’s (2006). Regression 
analyses with robust standard errors do not produce disparate results from those reported in this 
paper. Since a few cases with extreme values in the continuous dependent variable may influence 
analysis results (Greene 2003), this study runs a series of additional analyses. This study runs the 
same analyses reported here after deleting the top and bottom 1 % of the sample and runs median 
regressions (Greene 2003). These analyses produce results similar to those reported in this paper. 
For the third dependent variable (the natural logarithm of dollar amount of positive savings), this 
study uses the Heckman model because of a selection bias: the valid values of this dependent 
variable (for those had positive saving) had different characteristics than the others (those with 
zero or negative savings) (Greene 2003). This analysis uses bank account ownership in 1994 as 
an instrumental variable. Bank ownership at the beginning of the observation is likely to affect 
whether an individual household saved or not but not likely to affect how much it saved during 
the observation period [Results of additional analyses are available from the author].  
Each regression controls for household heads’ characteristics in 1994 (race, education, 
and age) and family characteristics (household size in 1994, change in household sizes between 
1994 and 2001, average family income during the observation period and its quadric form, and 
change in family income between 1994 and 2001). Two measures of state economic conditions 
are used in this study: 1) change in state unemployment rates between 1994 and 2001 (based on 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics data), and 2) per capita GSP (state equivalent to GDP, available 
from the Bureau of Economic Analyses) in 1994. This study also controls for the asset 
possession at the baseline (the value of financial assets in 1994 in financial assets regressions, 
bank account or vehicle ownership in 1994, in respective regression). This study weighted the 
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data with 2001 family weight variable (the weight variable of the last observed year) both for 
descriptive and multivariate analyses, as recommended by Hill (1992). 4 
FINDINGS 
Table 2 summarizes household characteristics and the distribution of financial and 
vehicle assets in the sample. The target group has lower levels of education and income and 
higher levels on household size and number of children in comparison with non-target group. 
The target group’s wealth is much lower than that of the comparison group. The average 
financial asset value among the former was only about $2,000 in 1994 while the average value 
was almost $20,000 among the latter. Only 38 percent possessed a bank account and 62 percent 
owned a vehicle in 1994 among the target group, whereas 77 percent and 87 percent of the 
comparison group did, respectively. Interestingly, gaps in bank account and vehicle ownership 
narrowed between the two groups: the gap fell from 39% in 1994 to 23% in 2001 for bank 
account ownership and from 25% to 16% for vehicle ownership.    
[Table 2 About Here] 
Table 3 reports multivariate analysis results on two dependent variables: the probability 
of saving financial assets (positive changes in financial assets) and amount of change in financial 
assets between 1994 and 2001. Following the example of Hurst and Ziliak (2006), this paper 
estimates the effect of countable asset limits, first. This study conducts two sets of analyses to 
capture the effects of the two distinct types of policy measures. Model 1 uses  the dollar amount 
of countable asset limit as in Hurst and Ziliak (2006) and Model 2 utilizes the number of years 
since a liberalized asset limit was adopted in a state, a measure unique in this study.     
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model using state asset limits for welfare applicants instead of those for welfare recipients, and a model including 
IDA program variable (whether a state had state-funded IDA programs or not in 2000). Results from these models 
are not substantially different from those reported in this paper.  
Washington University in St. Louis 
Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation 
Table 3 shows the results of three sets of analyses: 1) analyses using all male-headed 
households and female-headed households without children as the comparison group, 2) analyses 
based on male-headed households with children as the comparison group, and 3) a sample 
consisting of households whose heads have less than 13 years of school. Table 3 reports only key 
coefficients of interest: asset limit policy variables, the target population, and the interaction 
terms [Full estimation results are available from the author upon request].  
[Table 3 About Here] 
As shown in the first panel of results, which estimates the probability that a household 
will save any financial assets, the coefficient on the interaction term between the dollar amount 
of the countable asset limit and the target population indicator is not statistically significant in all 
three analyses. This result suggests that a higher countable asset limit does not significantly 
increase the target population’s probability of saving financial assets. Results based on the 
different measure of asset policy (the number of years elapsed from the adoption of new limit) 
tell a different story. The interaction term between the policy variable and the target population 
indicator is significantly positive in all three types of analyses (p<0.05). These results suggest 
that the longer a liberalized policy change had been in effect, the greater the probability that a 
likely welfare recipient had saved financial assets.  
The second panel of Table 3 reports results using the continuous measure: the dollar 
amount of change in financial assets between the two observed periods. The results based on the 
dollar amount of countable asset limit are consistent with those in Hurst and Ziliak (2006). The 
coefficients of the interaction term between the target population indicator and policy variable 
are not statistically significant in any of three models. In addition, the coefficients of the 
interaction term have different signs across models (two are negative and one is positive) as 
shown in Hurst and Ziliak (2006). The measure of the elapsed time does not show any significant 
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effect, either. The coefficients of the interaction term have positive signs (as expected) in all 
three models, unlike those based on the dollar amount of asset limit. The coefficients of this 
measure range from 1055 to 3883, suggesting that one year early adoption of higher asset limit 
may have increased the target population’s saving at least by $1,054.  
Table 4 summarizes the results using the natural logarithm of the dollar amount of 
financial assets accumulated during the observation period [Full estimation results are available 
from the author upon request]. The Heckman model used in these analyses produces two sets of 
estimations: one estimates how changes in asset limit policies influence the level of financial 
asset savings among those who succeeded in saving financial assets (first panel), and the other 
assesses how these policy changes affect one’s probability of being selected into the sample in 
the first panel (probability of having positive saving) (second panel). Results from these analyses 
suggest that the dollar amount of the asset limit has a significantly positive effect on the target 
population’s amount of savings accumulation (as displayed by the statistically significant 
coefficients of the interaction term in all six models including this measure). At the same time, 
the elapsed time since asset limits were liberalized significantly increases one’s probability of 
saving a positive amount of financial assets (as shown in significantly positive coefficients of 
interaction terms in all six models that include this measure).  
[Table 4 About Here] 
These results analyzing financial asset accumulation indicate that asset limit policies 
affect potential welfare recipients’ financial asset accumulation in fascinating ways. The more 
time that a liberalized policy has existed, the more likely the target population is to save, 
suggesting that they need time to learn about and adapt to the policy change. Among those who 
managed to save, the more liberalized the countable asset limit policy in the state of residence, 
the more financial assets female-headed households with children were able to save, provided 
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they saved anything. If we can assume that those who succeeded in saving are more likely to be 
aware of increased asset limits and to adapt to the policy change than others, this finding 
suggests that the level of generosity in asset limit policy may influence the level of financial 
asset accumulation among the target population who have learned about and utilized the 
opportunities created by this policy change.   
Table 5 summarizes results based on two other types of asset accumulation: bank account 
and vehicle ownership [Full estimation results are available from the author upon request]. 
Unlike Hurst and Ziliak (2006), this study includes those who did have own a bank account or a 
vehicle in 1994 in the sample because it cannot be assumed without empirical evidence that 
states’ decisions about asset limits are not correlated with their residents’ needs for and actual 
ownership before policy changes. Therefore, this study uses the full sample in analyzing the 
relationship between relaxed asset limit policies and these two types of asset ownership. 
Recognizing that those who owned a bank account or a vehicle in 1994 were more likely to do so 
in 2001, this study controls for the ownership status of respective property in the base year in the 
models.  
[Table 5 About Here] 
As shown in Table 5, the study produces results identical to those in Hurst and Ziliak 
(2006) regarding the relationship between bank account ownership and the amount of countable 
asset limit. When measuring the state policy with the traditional measure used in Hurst and 
Ziliak (2006), liberalized asset policy does not show a significant effect on the target 
population’s probability of having a bank account in 2001. However, the elapsed time since 
liberalizing asset limits again shows a statistically significant effect. The interaction term 
between the policy variable reflecting time and the target population indicator has a significantly 
positive coefficient at the 0.05 level in all three models, indicating that the more time that has 
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passed since liberalization, the more likely it is that likely welfare recipients possess bank 
accounts, ceteris paribus. These results confirm the utility of considering the time dimension as 
well as the dollar amount of a policy change in order to understand how a policy affects its target 
population.   
Table 5 also reports results estimating the probability of vehicle ownership. Relaxed asset 
limit policy, either measures with the dollar amount of asset limit or years since a new policy 
was adopted, does not show a significant effect on vehicle ownership among female-headed 
households with children. Findings on vehicle ownership in this study differ from those reported 
by Hurst and Ziliak (2006) who reported that a relaxed countable asset limit raised vehicle 
ownership among the target population in a statistically significant way. The discrepancy 
between the two studies can be attributed to several factors. While Hurst and Ziliak (2006) 
limited their sample to those who did not own a vehicle in 1994, this study uses the full sample 
and controlled for vehicle ownership in the base year. As described fully in footnote 3, this study 
assigned slightly different values to some states’ countable asset limits from those by Hurst and 
Ziliak (2006). This study weighted the data with 2001 family weight variable whereas Hurst and 
Ziliak (2006) did not. When replicating Hurst and Ziliak’s (2006) analysis using the same 
sample selection criteria (only those who did not own a vehicle in 1994) and same definition of 
policy variable without weighting the data, this study obtained results similar to theirs: the dollar 
amount of countable asset limits has a significantly positive association with the target 
population’s probability of having an automobile. Accordingly, the different results between the 
two studies appear to be due to the sample selection criteria, slightly different state asset limit 
values, and the use of the sample weight. 5   
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1994 and 1999. Neither actual amount of countable asset limit nor the number of years since the new policy 
adoption significantly increases the target population’s financial or vehicle assets. The coefficients of the interaction 
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In order to evaluate whether the relationships between countable asset limit policy and 
the target population’s asset accumulation reported above may be artifacts of other policies, this 
study conducts analyses that include other welfare reform policies: vehicle asset limit policies, 
time-limits on lifetime welfare receipt, and state maximum welfare benefit. Like other analyses 
reported above, these analyses replicate Hurst and Ziliak’s (2006) models.  
Table 6 summarizes the results for this robustness check, using three different types of 
asset accumulation that show significant impacts of liberalized asset limit policy as shown in 
Tables 3-5: positive savings in financial assets, natural logarithm of financial asset change, and 
bank account ownership. These analyses use all male-headed households and female-headed 
households without children as the comparison group. The addition of these policy variables 
does not change the main findings regarding the impact of countable asset limits on financial 
asset accumulation. As in previous analyses, the elapsed time since liberalization significantly 
increases the target population’s likelihood of saving a positive amount of financial assets 
(p<0.1) and of owning a bank account (p<0.05). The dollar amount of countable asset limits 
show a significant effect in the analysis of the natural logarithm of the financial asset change 
(p<0.1).  
[Table 6 About Here] 
The results of this study suggest there is no statistically significant relationship between 
vehicle asset limits and target population’s probability of saving financial assets and of owning a 
bank account. None of interaction terms between vehicle asset policy variables (measured either 
with the dollar amount or years since the adoption of a new limit) has a statistically significant  
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terms, however, have the same sign as those reported in this paper in the analyses that show significant effects of 
new asset limits on asset accumulation between 1994-2001 (positive coefficient of the interaction with the number 
of years after the adoption of a new policy in the positive saving and bank account analyses and positive coefficient 
of the interaction term with the amount of asset limit in the logarithm of financial asset saving analysis).     
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coefficient.  Liberalized vehicle asset limit policies, however, show significantly negative effects 
on the natural logarithm of the dollar amount of financial asset change: both interaction terms are 
large and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Analysis result on the dollar amount of 
financial asset change also show a similar pattern of the relationship with vehicle asset limits: a 
positive coefficient of the interaction term with having a vehicle limit and significant and 
negative coefficient of the interaction term with the dollar amount of vehicle limit [not reported 
in Table but full results are available from the author]. These findings suggest that generous 
vehicle assets may lower that target population’s financial asset accumulation if all other things 
are equal. Negative effects of liberalized vehicle limits on financial asset accumulation may be 
explained with their potential influence on spending on vehicles. It is plausible that generous 
vehicle asset limits may have encouraged the target population to spend their financial assets in 
buying expensive vehicles and therefore, may have lowered financial assets among this 
population. This explanation has not been empirically tested and warrants further investigation.  
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper examines the impact of liberalized asset limits on asset accumulation among 
likely welfare recipients, using two distinct measures of policy liberalization: 1) the generosity 
of asset limit policies and 2) the elapsed time during which these liberalized policies have been 
in place. The analyses of this study show that liberalized asset limit policies are positively 
associated with the target population’s probabilities of saving financial assets and possessing 
bank accounts. The longer a liberalized countable asset limit has been in place, the more likely 
the target population is to achieve a positive change in financial assets and to possess a bank 
account. Analysis results also suggest that the level of generosity in asset limit policy may 
influence the level of financial asset accumulation among members of the target population 
provided they can save anything. Considering even modest levels of assets can improve the 
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quality of life among low-income families (Edin 2001), findings of this study support that we 
maintain or expand the liberalization of asset eligibility rules in various public assistance 
programs in order to promote long-term well-being of low-income households. 
This study may help understand contrasting findings between the two recent studies 
(Hurst and Ziliak 2006; Sullivan 2006) and an older study (Powers 1998). Using the amount of 
asset limit measure, Hurst and Ziliak (2006) and Sullivan (2006) have shown that asset limits 
have essentially no effect on financial asset accumulation. These recent findings run in stark 
contrast to Powers’ (1998) study showing that higher AFDC asset limits had a significantly 
positive association with likely welfare recipients’ saving.  
The differences between Powers (1998) and the two recent studies (Hurst and Ziliak 
2006; Sullivan 2006) may be attributable to the distinct characteristics of policy changes studied. 
First, the nature of the changes in asset limit policies was quite different: in one case, asset limits 
were reduced (made more stringent); in the other, asset limits were raised (liberalized). Powers 
(1998) examined the impact of changes in asset limit policies after the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act (OBRA) was passed. In this case, asset limits were reduced in many states, 
and welfare recipients, especially those with wealth beyond the newly reduced asset limits, 
probably would have learned about policy changes soon after the OBRA took effect because 
welfare offices would have informed them about their loss of eligibility. In contrast, Hurst and 
Ziliak (2006) and Sullivan (2006) investigated the effects of increased asset limits during the 
1990s. In this case, the process by which welfare recipients would learn about policy changes 
would have been quite different. Welfare offices do not always provide complete information 
about eligibility rule changes to individuals who are not at risk of losing eligibility, and at any 
case, learning about the changes would have likely taken more time (Kahn and Polakow 2000). 
Furthermore, the two policy contexts have quite different implications for the target population: 
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when asset limits are reduced, target households might respond with spending down their 
savings in order to qualify for welfare; when asset limits are raised, target households are 
expected to respond with reduced consumption and greater savings in order to take advantage of 
new opportunities provided by welfare reform. Spending down savings can be done quickly; 
accumulating savings takes much longer. In summary, Powers (1998) investigated a policy 
change that would have affected the target population immediately after it had been implemented 
while the two recent studies (Hurst and Ziliak 2006; Sullivan 2006) examined a policy change 
which would have taken time to demonstrate its effects on the target population. The findings of 
this study support this explanation by showing that an alternative measure, one reflecting a time-
dimension, is able to detect policy effects that traditional measures of policy change do not. It is, 
therefore, recommended to take into account the time dimension of a policy change as well as 
the extent of a policy change in estimating its effectiveness.  
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Table 1. State AFDC/TANF Asset Limit Policies. 
Countable Account Limit Vehicle Limit State Year  Amount  Year  Amount 
Alabama  1997  2000 1997 No limit 
Alaska  No change 1000 1997 No limit 
Arizona  1998 2000 1996 No limit 
Arkansas  1997 3000 1997 No limit 
California  1994 2000 1994 4650 
Colorado  1997 2000 1997 No limit 
Connecticut  1995 3000 1995 9500 
Delaware  No change 1000 1996 4650 
D. C.  1999 2000 1999 4650  
Florida  1998 2000 1998 8500 
Georgia  No change 1000 1997 4650 
Hawaii. 1997 5000 1997 No limit 
Idaho  1997 2000 1997 4650 
Illinois  1997 3000 1997 No limit 
Indiana  1997 1500 1999 5000 
Iowa  1994 5000 1994 3959 
Kansas 1998 2000 1997 No limit 
Kentucky  1997 2000 1997 No limit 
Louisiana  1998 2000 1998 10000 
Maine  1998 2000 1996 No limit 
Maryland  1997 2000 1997 No limit 
Massachusetts 1996 2500 1996 5000 
Michigan  1997 3000 1995 No limit 
Minnesota  1998 5000 1997 7500 
Mississippi  1999 2000 1999 4650  
Missouri  1995 5000 1995 No limit 
Montana 1997 3000 1997 No limit 
Nebraska  1998  6000 1998 No limit 
Nevada  1997 2000 1997 No limit 
N. Hampshire  1997 2000 1997 No limit 
New Jersey  1997 2000 1997 9500 
New Mexico 1997 3500 1997 No limit 
New York  1998 2000 1998 4650 
N. Carolina  1996 3000 1996 No limit  
N. Dakota  1998 8000 1998 No limit 
Ohio  1997 No limit 1996 No limit 
Oklahoma  No change 1000 1998 5000 
Oregon  1996 10000 1995 10000 
Pennsylvania  No change 1000 1998 No limit 
Rhode Island  No change 1000 1997 4600 
S. Carolina  1997 2500 1997 No limit  
S. Dakota 1998 2000 1998 No limit  
Tennessee  1997 2000 1997 4600 
Texas  1997 2000 1997 4650 
Utah  1996 2000 1996 8000 
Vermont  No change 1000 1994 No limit 
Virginia No change 1000 1997 7500 
Washington  1998  3000 1998 5000 
West Virginia  1998 2000 1997 No limit  
Wisconsin  1997 2500 1997 10000 
Wyoming  1997 2500 1997 12000 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample, Target Group, and Comparison Group 
 
 
 
Full Sample 
Target Group 
Female Heads with 
Children 
Comparison Group 
Male Heads and Female 
Heads without Children  
On Welfare in 1994*** 0.06 0.39 0.01 
On Welfare Between 1994-2001*** 0.08 0.48 0.02 
    
Age *** 34.39 31.80 34.76 
African-American *** 0.20 0.61 0.14 
Household Size in 1994 *** 2.90 3.21 2.85 
Change in Household size (1994-2001) 0.01 0.06 0.00 
Number of Children*** 1.19 2.08 1.06 
% with Children under 17*** 0.59 1.00 0.53 
Head’s Education in 1994 *** 
   Less than High School 
   High School Degree  
   Some College     
 
0.13 
0.51 
0.36 
 
0.29 
0.37 
0.34 
 
0.11 
0.53 
0.37 
Averaged Family Income (1994 and 
2001)***  
    Mean           
    Median 
 
$38,709.35 
$33.841.96 
 
$13,740.67 
$11,859.56 
 
$42,357.22 
$39,080.11 
Change in Family Income (1994-2001)  
    Mean           
    Median  
  
$9,184.63  
$6,287.39  
 
$9,651.91 
$7,126.97  
 
$9,116.36  
$6,138.73  
Change in State Unemployment Rate (1994-
2001)  
-1.29 -1.34 -1.18 
Per Capita GSP in 1994 (in $1000) * 27.32 28.03 27.22 
    
Financial Assets in 1994 *** 
        Mean 
        Median 
 
$17,191 
$1,588 
 
$1,998 
$0 
 
$19,411 
$2,117 
Change in Financial Assets (1994-2001) 
        Mean 
        Median 
 
$4,829 
$0 
 
$1,433 
$0 
 
$5,326 
$9 
Saved Financial Assets (1994-2001) * 0.50 0.41 0.51 
    
Possessed Bank Account in 1994*** 0.72 0.38 0.77 
Possessed Bank Account in 2001*** 0.78 0.58 0.81 
    
Owned a Vehicle in 1994*** 0.84 0.62 0.87 
Owned a Vehicle in 2001*** 0.87 0.73 0.89 
N 1,363 277 1,086 
 
* p <0.1; ** p <0.05; *** p < 0.01, t-tests and χ2 tests of differences between the target and comparison 
groups.
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Table 3. Countable Asset Limits on Positive Saving and Dollar Amount of Change in 
Financial Assets  
Comparison Group and sample 
composition 
A. All male heads and 
female heads without 
children (fewer than 16 
years of schooling) 
B. Male heads with 
children (fewer than 16 
years of schooling) 
C. All male heads and 
female heads without 
children  (fewer than 13 
years of schooling) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Positive Saving (Dichotomous) 
0.010  -0.020  0.018  Countable Asset Limit Amount (in 
thousands) (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.018)  
0.041  0.075  0.045  Countable Asset Limit Amount ×  
Target Group  (0.046)  (0.047)  (0.065)  
 -0.007  -0.029  0.000 Countable Asset Limit Elapsed Years 
Since Liberalization  (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.012) 
 0.054**  0.071**  0.078*** Countable Asset Limit Elapsed 
Years ×  Target Group   (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.029) 
-0.107 -0.220** -0.237* -0.344** -0.129 -0.323*** Target Group 
(0.127) (0.108) (0.143) (0.136) (0.166) (0.117) 
 
Change in Financial Assets (Continuous) 
371.60  -1666.18  1537.35  Countable Asset Limit Amount (in 
thousands) (1428.68)  (1402.07  (2153.54)  
-1006.65  1474.47  -2715.31  Countable Asset Limit Amount ×  
Target Group  (2448.87)  (2422.07)  (3828.74)  
 -1426.20  -3293.93  667.23 Countable Asset Limit Elapsed Years 
Since Liberalization  (1258.00)  (1837.19)  (1303.41) 
 1959.76  3883.21  1054.54 Countable Asset Limit Elapsed 
Years ×  Target Group   (1666.17)  (2245.37)  (1761.92) 
-3750.96 -13595.2 -17888.1** -30089.8** 2480.83 -7491.07 Target Group (9570.92) (9895.1) (7589.3) (11975.5) (9422.94) (13353.43) 
N 1,363 842 914 
 
Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
* p <0.1; ** p <0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
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Table 4. Countable Asset Limits on Logarithm of Financial Assets Change Amount 
Comparison Group and sample 
composition 
A. All male heads and female heads 
without children (fewer than 16 years 
of schooling) 
B. Male heads with children (fewer 
than 16 years of schooling) 
C. All male heads and female heads 
without children  (fewer than 13 
years of schooling) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Ln (Change in Financial Assets) 
0.06  0.04 -0.05  -0.03 0.01  -0.01 Countable Asset Limit Amount (in 
thousands) (0.06)  (0.06) (0.10)  (0.09) (0.08)  (0.07) 
0.74***  0.74*** 0.79***  0.73*** 1.45***  1.42** Countable Asset Limit Amount ×  
Target Group  (0.27)  (0.27) (0.28)  (0.27) (0.55)  (0.56) 
 0.10*   -0.10   0.07  Countable Asset Limit Elapsed Years 
Since Liberalization  (0.06)   (0.08)   (0.06)  
 0.22   0.44**   0.49  Countable Asset Limit Elapsed 
Years ×  Target Group   (0.18)   (0.20)   (0.31)  
-1.49 -0.69 -1.48 -1.81* -1.79* -1.62* -3.87** -2.71 -3.80** Target Group (0.96) (0.91) (0.96) (0.95) (0.95) (0.94) (1.77) (1.76) (1.79) 
          
Selection into positive saving          
0.02   -0.05   0.06   Countable Asset Limit Amount (in 
thousands) (0.03)   (0.05)   (0.05)   
0.13   0.24*   0.16   Countable Asset Limit Amount ×  
Target Group  (0.13)   (0.14)   (0.19)   
 -0.02 -0.02  -0.06 -0.06  0.00 0.00 Countable Asset Limit Elapsed Years 
Since Liberalization  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.04)  (0.03) (0.03) 
 0.15** 0.15**  0.19** 0.17**  0.23** 0.22** Countable Asset Limit Elapsed 
Years ×  Target Group  (0.07) (0.07)  (0.08) (0.08)  (0.10) (0.10) 
-0.37 -0.65** -0.63** -0.88** -1.06*** -0.97** -0.44 -0.98** -0.96** Target Group (0.35) (0.32) (0.31) (0.41) (0.40) (0.39) (0.50) (0.44) (0.45) 
N 1,363 842 914 
Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
* p <0.1; ** p <0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
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Table 5. Bank Account and Vehicle Ownership: Models with General Account 
Limit 
Comparison Group and sample 
composition 
A. All male heads and 
female heads without 
children (fewer than 16 
years of schooling) 
B. Male heads with 
children (fewer than 16 
years of schooling) 
C. All male heads and 
female heads without 
children  (fewer than 13 
years of schooling) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Bank Account Ownership 
-0.002  -0.018  -0.002  Countable Asset Limit Amount (in 
thousands) (0.009)  (0.014)  (0.012)  
0.023  0.041  0.028  Countable Asset Limit Amount ×  
Target Group  (0.040)  (0.042)  (0.063)  
 -0.007  -0.018  -0.001 Countable Asset Limit Elapsed Years 
Since Liberalization  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.009) 
 0.049**  0.056**  0.047** Countable Asset Limit Elapsed 
Years ×  Target Group   (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.030) 
0.016 -0.117 -0.046 -0.169 0.021 -0.092 Target Group 
(0.115) (0.098) (0.126) (0.113) (0.175) (0.139) 
 
Vehicle Ownership 
0.000  -0.003  0.002 0.000 Countable Asset Limit Amount (in 
thousands) (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007) (0.006) 
0.001  -0.001  -0.033 0.001 Countable Asset Limit Amount ×  
Target Group  (0.038)  (0.039)  (0.054) (0.038) 
 -0.002  -0.006  0.006 Countable Asset Limit Elapsed Years 
Since Liberalization  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
 0.006  0.008  -0.024 Countable Asset Limit Elapsed 
Years ×  Target Group   (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.023) 
0.002 -0.020 -0.087 -0.118 0.039 0.057 Target Group (0.093) (0.070) (0.100) (0.079) (0.130) (0.091) 
N 1,363 842 914 
 
Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
* p <0.1; ** p <0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
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Table 6.  Asset Limits and Asset Accumulation: Models with Other Policy Variables 
 Positive Saving 
(Dichotomous) 
Ln (Saved Assets) 
(Continuous) 
Bank Account 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
0.008  0.008  -0.004  Countable Asset Limit Amount (in 
thousands) (0.015)  (0.072)  (0.010)  
0.046  0.435*  0.052  Countable Asset Limit Amount ×  
Target Group  (0.046)  (0.259)  (0.038)  
-0.076  -0.946*  -0.092  Any Vehicle Limit 
(0.089)  (0.498)  (0.066)  
0.344  6.507***  0.158  Any Vehicle Limit ×  Target Group 
(0.301)  (1.625)  (0.195)  
0.009  0.136*  0.007  Vehicle Limit Amount (in thousands) 
(0.013)  (0.071)  (0.010)  
-0.037  -1.194***  0.017  Vehicle Limit Amount ×  Target 
Group (0.052)  (0.261)  (0.031)  
 -0.021  0.085  -0.007 Countable Asset Limit Elapsed Years 
 (0.015)  (0.081)  (0.010) 
 0.058*  0.107  0.061** Countable Asset Limit Elapsed 
Years ×  Target Group   (0.034)  (0.270)  (0.031) 
 0.028  -0.020  0.000 Vehicle Limit Elapsed Years 
 (0.021)  (0.116)  (0.016) 
 -0.005  0.274  -0.021 Vehicle Limit Elapsed Years ×  
Target Group   (0.043)  (0.366)  (0.037) 
-0.044 -0.097 1.040 0.240 -0.102 0.037 Target Group 
(0.230) (0.206) (1.215) (1.433) (0.171) (0.160) 
N 1,363 1,363 1,363 
Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
* p <0.1; ** p <0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed 
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